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ABSTRACT 
In recent comparative works on the constitutional structures of contemporary liberal democracies, 
the United States and Germany have been grouped together as examples of democratic systems 
with an exceptionally high degree of “institutional pluralism”. In other typologies both countries 
have even been classified as “semisovereign democracies”. Whereas such classifications are of 
some use, especially in the field of public policy research, they fail to pay reasonable attention to 
the fundamental difference between parliamentary and presidential government that dominated 
the older literature on comparative political systems. As the comparative assessments offered in 
this paper suggest, the difference between parliamentary government and presidential 
government does not only constitute very different conditions of executive leadership in the core 
executive territory and at the level of executive-legislative relations, but has also a strong impact 
on the role and performance of the various “veto players” that characterize the political systems 
of the United States and Germany, and which are at the center of this paper. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper offers a comparative institutionalist perspective on the constitutional prac-
tice in the United States and in the Federal Republic of Germany, Western Europe’s larg-
est economy and a key player in the European Union. While there have been occasional 
attempts on either side of the Atlantic to put individual German and American political 
institutions in perspective,
1 there is certainly no tradition of systematic comparison of 
key areas of politics and policy in both countries. Several possible reasons may account 
for this, including persisting language barriers (especially on the American side) and the 
lack of viable theoretical concepts to stimulate German-American comparisons. Another 
may be observed in that few American scholars consider Germany as the prototype of 
parliamentary government in Western Europe. Most two-country-comparisons focusing 
on the different structural features and working logics of presidential and parliamentary 
government tend to compare the United States with the United Kingdom,
2 rather than the 
U.S. with Germany, even though the British version of parliamentary government can 
barely be considered a typical manifestation of West European parliamentary govern-
ment. 
The starting point for the comparative assessment of some of the key institutional ar-
rangements in the United States and Germany to be offered in this paper is the strikingly 
                                                                                                                                                 
* I feel indebted to Paul-André Bempéchat for his exceptionally kind and generous support in turning an 
earlier draft of this paper into a publishable essay. 
1 See for instance Uwe Thaysen, Roger H. Davidson and Robert Gerald Livingston, eds., The U.S. Con-
gress and the German Bundestag (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990); Daniel Halberstam and Roderick M. 
Hills Jr., “State Autonomy in Germany and the United States,” The Annals No. 574 (2001): 173-184; Franz 
Gress and Jackson Jones, eds, Reforming Governance. Lessons from the United States of America and the 
Federal Republic of Germany (Frankfurt a.M. and New York: Campus, 2001). 
2 See, for instance, Richard Hodder-Williams and James Ceaser, eds., Politics in Britain and the United 
States. Comparative Perspectives (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986); Malcolm Walles, British and 
American Systems of Government (Deddington, Oxford: P. Allan, 1988); Colin Campbell and Margaret 
Jane Wyszomirski, eds, Executive Leadership in Anglo-American Systems (Pittsburgh: University of Pitts-
burgh Press, 1991); Colin Campbell, The U.S. Presidency in Crisis. A Comparative Perspective (New York 
and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).   3
similar classification of both countries in many of the more recent typologies of contem-
porary liberal democracies. In Josep Colomer’s well-known institution-focused typology 
of contemporary constitutional democracies, the United States and Germany are grouped 
together as types of liberal democracy that share exceptionally high degrees of “institu-
tional pluralism”
3 – to be understood as a large array of what many would now call in-
stitutional “veto players,”
4 such as independent central banks, powerful second chambers 
or constitutional courts. A similar assessment has been offered more recently by Manfred 
G. Schmidt, who – for the same reasons – classifies both the United States and Germany 
as “semisovereign democracies.”
5 These and other classifications hold common ground 
in that they do not specifically account for the fundamental difference between presiden-
tial and parliamentary government, which has been at the center of most older works 
within the field of comparative politics.
6 As far as this dimension has been considered in 
the more recent literature on constitutional structures and public policy at all, presidential 
government has been treated as just another component of “institutional pluralism” and a 
power-separating state structure.
7 
In this paper I would like to combine both perspectives – the variations of the “veto 
player”-approach, which has dominated more recent public policy research, and the more 
                                                 
3 Josep M. Colomer, “Introduction,” in Josep M. Colomer, ed., Political Institutions in Europe (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1996), 9. 
4 The term “veto player” has been popularized by the works of George Tsebelis, in which political pro-
cesses are studied from a rational choice perspective. See George Tsebelis, “Decision-Making in Political 
Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism, and Multipartyism,” British 
Journal of Political Science 25 (1995): 289-326; “Veto Players and Law Production in Parliamentary De-
mocracies: An Empirical Analysis,” American Political Science Review 93 (1999): 591-608; “Veto Players 
and Institutional Analysis,” Governance 13 (2000): 441-474; Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). – In Tsebelis’s works the traditional differentiation between 
specific institutional characteristics of political systems – such as the structure of the party system or the 
electoral system – has been replaced by the idea of variable constellations of “veto players.” For Tsebelis, 
the key dependent variable to which attention must be drawn is the degree of policy stability within a given 
political system or, differently stated, the degree to which actors are able to change the (legislative) status 
quo. – While I do not explicitly draw upon Tsebelis’s sophisticated theoretical concept of “veto players,” 
some of his key assumptions are readily acknowledged here. This holds true in particular for Tsebelis’s 
contention that the positioning of individual “veto players” (especially in terms of party control of political 
institutions) usually matters more than the sheer number of “veto players” to be found in a given system – 
a proposition that would seem to make a comparison of two political systems with an equally large number 
of institutional “veto players,” such as the United States and Germany, an even more instructive exercise. 
5 Manfred G. Schmidt, “The Impact of Political Parties, Constitutional Structures and Veto Players on Pub-
lic Policy,” in Hans Keman, ed., Comparative Democratic Politics (London: Sage, 2002), 178. 
6 See, inter alia, Arend Lijphart, ed., Parliamentary versus Presidential Government (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1992).   4
traditional focus on parliamentary vs. presidential government – in order to reassess the 
institutional parameters of executive leadership and public policy-making in the United 
States and Germany.
8 In the following sections I will consider both the role of the “clas-
sic” institutional “veto players” (such as second chambers, central banks, and constitu-
tional courts) as well as the role of the interest groups, and the media, which have more 
recently been identified by some observers as the real “veto players” with which contem-
porary governments in western democracies must contend.
9 Given the predictably greater 
familiarity of most readers with American political institutions, this study will highlight 
the differences between the two countries from an American perspective. 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 See for instance the highly influential index by E. Huber, C. Ragin and J. D. Stephens, “Social Democ-
racy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State,” American Journal of So-
ciology 99 (1993): 728. 
8 The aim of this article is strictly confined to looking at the institutional parameters of executive leadership 
in the wider political process. Both a discussion of the respective institutional parameters of executive 
leadership in the core executive territory and an inquiry into the leadership process itself have been offered 
elsewhere and lie beyond the focus of this paper. Valuable volumes that include chapters on both countries 
are Richard Rose and Ezra N. Suleiman, eds., Presidents and Prime Ministers (Washington DC: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1980); Robert Elgie, Political Leadership in Liberal De-
mocracies (London: Macmillan, 1995); B. Guy Peters, R. A. W. Rhodes and Vincent Wright, eds., Admin-
istering the Summit. Administration of the Core Executive in Developed Countries (London: Macmillan, 
2000); R. Kent Weaver and Paul B. Stares, eds., Guidance for Governance: Comparing Alternative Sour-
ces of Public Policy Advice (Tokyo and New York: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2001). 
9 Ralf Dahrendorf, “Regierungen ohne Opposition,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 November 2002.   5
 
THE U.S. SENATE AND THE GERMAN BUNDESRAT 
 
Bicameralism is one of the few institutional characteristics of contemporary western 
democracies unanimously considered to be among the most important “counter-
majoritarian institutions,” or institutional “veto players.” Unlike the U.S. Senate, the Ger-
man Bundesrat is formally not a “second chamber” at all. In a 1974 judgment, the Ger-
man Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe explicitly dismissed the idea of referring 
to the Bundesrat as the second chamber of a split yet integrated legislative assembly.
10 
Still, in comparative works by leading German and foreign scholars alike, the Bundesrat 
in terms of its own functioning has long been accepted as very much a second chamber.
11 
Whereas some of the structural features of a genuine “second chamber” are absent, the 
Bundesrat even plays a stronger role in the federal decision-making process than most of 
its counterparts in other advanced democracies. 
Nevertheless, as a closer look reveals, the Bundesrat’s formal position in the political 
decision-making process is slightly weaker than that of the U.S. Senate. Not only does 
the Senate have considerably more power in the legislative arena, as each bill has to se-
cure the Senate’s approval, but there is also no equivalent in Germany for the Senate’s 
powerful role in the confirmation process of presidential nominees for high public office. 
Whereas in the legislative arena the Senate has proved to be an easier-to-tackle body for 
most presidents than the House – at least in terms of the statistically calculated average 
presidential success rates
12 – the Senate’s power to block presidential nominations has 
come to be considered a serious structural defect of the American system. While only a 
very small proportion of presidential nominees formally fails to secure the Senate’s ap-
proval, especially in the area of cabinet nominations, the indirect power of the Senate is 
immense. In fact, presidents try inexorably to avoid a final showdown in the Senate by 
                                                 
10 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, Vol. 37 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1974):  380. 
11 See Klaus von Beyme, “Die Funktionen des Bundesrates. Ein Vergleich mit Zwei-Kammer-Systemen im 
Ausland,“ in Der Bundesrat, ed., Der Bundesrat als Verfassungsorgan und politische Kraft (Bad Honnef 
and Darmstadt: Neue Darmstädter Verlagsanstalt, 1974); Arendt Lijphart, Democracies. Patterns of Major-
itarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries (London and New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1984), 100. 
12 Roger H. Davidson and Colton C. Campbell, “The Senate and the Executive,” in Burdett A. Loomis, ed., 
Esteemed Colleagues. Civility and Deliberation in the U.S. Senate (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2000).   6
withdrawing candidates who cannot reasonably be expected to secure approval.
13 How-
ever, even if an administration eventually gets its way, the extreme time costs of the sen-
atorial process of scrutiny puts a heavy burden on any incoming administration that many 
observers now find unreasonable or even unacceptable.
14 
As opposed to the constitutional structures of some other major western countries, 
such as Britain or Italy, bicameralism both in the United States and in Germany has been 
inseparably associated with the concept of federalism.
15 This having been said, there are 
important differences as to how bicameralism is organized in each country’s political 
system. To begin with, there are differences in terms of representation and recruitment of 
the Senate and the Bundesrat.  
At the federal level, the Bundesrat basically represents the state governments, rather 
than a given state’s population. Members of the Bundesrat are not elected, but appointed 
as delegated members of the state government. The number of seats a state may have in 
the Bundesrat
16 varies according to demographics, but each state has to cast its vote as a 
bloc vote. Very differently from U.S. senators, individual members of the Bundesrat do 
not play any role in the legislative process. The state governments, rather than their dele-
gates in the Bundesrat, are the initiators of legislation. However, since the early days of 
                                                 
13 Glen S. Krutz, Richard Fleisher and Jon R. Bond, “From Abe Fortas to Zoë Baird: Why Some Presi-
dential Nominations Fail in the Senate,” American Political Science Review 92 (1998): 871-881. 
14 See on this the special issue of The Brookings Review 19, 2 (2001), ed. by G. Calvin Mackenzie. 
15 Some degree of assessment of the key characteristics and historical developments of the German and 
American federal system are in order at this stage. Both the basic institutional characteristics of the federal 
system and the cultural inclination towards the very idea of federalism have remained very different in the 
United States and Germany. While the American federal system has never fully lost the roots of its “dual 
federalism,” the German system may best be described as a system of “interlocking” federalism, in which 
the lion’s share of legislation is mandated at the federal level, whereas its implementation is left to the 
states. As to the historical developments of both federal systems, each country has experienced an extended 
period of centralization, at times countered by various attempts to devolve power to the states. Indications 
of decentralization appeared earlier in the United States than in Germany, and strategies to reform the fed-
eral system remained rather different. In both countries, however, an interest of the respective federal ad-
ministrations to reduce the financial responsibilities of the federation played an important role. For com-
parative assessments see Roland Sturm, “Föderalismus in Deutschland und in den USA – Tendenzen der 
Angleichung?” Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 28 (1997): 335-345; David B. Walker, “Von der Differenz 
zur Konvergenz? Deutscher und amerikanischer Bundesstaat im Vergleich,” in Tobias Dürr and Franz 
Walter, eds., Solidargemeinschaft und fragmentierte Gesellschaft: Parteien, Milieus und Verbände im Ver-
gleich. Festschrift für Peter Lösche (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 1999); Halberstam and Hills, “State Au-
tonomy in Germany and the United States.” 
16 The degree of inequality in terms of representation is less significant than in the United States, but still 
considerable when compared to some of the smaller federations in Western Europe, such as Austria or Bel-
gium. For comparative figures see Alfred Stepan, “Toward a New Comparative Politics of Federalism, 
(Multi)Nationalism, and Democracy: Beyond Rikerian Federalism,” in Alfred Stepan, Arguing Compara-
tive Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 350.   7
the Federal Republic, the veto powers of the Bundesrat, rather than its role as the initiator 
of federal bills, have been at the center of public political debate. 
The Bundesrat’s veto power – or more precisely, the proportion of bills which the 
Bundesrat can effectively veto
17 – has significantly increased over the past decades. 
Whereas just about 42 percent of all federal bills were considered to fall into the category 
of so-called “Zustimmungsgesetze” between 1949 and 1953, this proportion has grown to 
60 percent in the past decade.
18 The state governments had a vested interest in compen-
sating their gradual loss of legislative decision-making power by securing a greater say 
on federal bills. They could not have brought about this development, though, without 
the support of the Federal Constitutional Court, which issued a plethora of judgments that 
established notably generous co-determinative powers of the states (Länder) via the 
Bundesrat.
19 
The majority of political debates concerning the Bundesrat’s role in the federal deci-
sion-making process have, however, focused on the degree and the effects of “party poli-
ticization” of the Bundesrat, rather than on the weight of the individual states or state 
governments in the federal decision-making arena. Until the late 1960s, the decision-
making logic in the Bundesrat was barely influenced by the regional party majorities. 
The early institutional conflicts between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat focused on the 
Bundesrat’s general role in the federal decision-making arena, rather than on the impact 
of the parties on the voting behavior of individual states.
20 This changed after the first 
major shift of power in the Federal Republic’s political history in 1969, which brought to 
office the first Social Democratic chancellor of the postwar period. The Social-Liberal 
government under Chancellor Willy Brandt encountered almost constant opposition by a 
                                                 
17 The Bundesrat may veto any bill that has been passed by the Bundestag, but only some bills (so-called 
“approval bills” or “Zustimmungsgesetze”) require the explicit approval of the Bundesrat. Vetoes on other 
bills may be overruled by the Bundestag. However, if the Bundesrat has vetoed a bill with a two-thirds ma-
jority, an equivalent majority in the Bundestag is needed to overturn a veto of the Bundesrat. 
18 Stephen Silvia, “Reform Gridlock and the Role of the Bundesrat in German Politics,” in Joanne B. 
Brzinski, Thomas D. Lancaster and Christian Tuschhoff, eds., Compounded Representation in West 
European Federations (London: Cass, 1999),  175. 
19 Philip Blair and Peter Cullen, “Federalism, Legalism and Political Reality: The Record of the Federal 
Constitutional Court,” in Charlie Jeffery, ed., Recasting German Federalism. The Legacies of German Uni-
fication (London and New York: Pinter, 1999). 
20 Ursula Münch, “Der Bundesrat im Kontext neuer Regierungsprogramme,” in Hans-Ulrich Derlien and 
Axel Murswieck, eds., Regieren nach Wahlen (Opladen: Leske & Budrich, 2002).   8
Bundesrat controlled by the Christian Democrats.
21 The 1970s also witnessed an impor-
tant change in the political culture of the federal decision-making process, with one pow-
erful opposition leader and later chancellor, Helmut Kohl, declaring publicly that he 
would not consider it reasonable to lend his party’s support to help achieve the goals of a 
SPD-led federal government. While a notable degree of “party politicization” of the Bun-
desrat has always existed, its actual manifestations have changed in accordance with 
changing patterns of party control between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. For much 
of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s – a period marked by long years of SPD op-
position in the Bundestag and a less than impressive electoral performance by the Social 
Democrats in most of the states – the extant “party politicization” of the Bundesrat mani-
fested itself primarily by a notable absence of Bundesrat vetoes on major government 
bills. In contrast, reflecting the changes in patterns of party control, “party politicization” 
of the Bundesrat since the mid-1990s has been more likely to produce a notable reluc-
tance of the “second chamber” to pass legislation initiated by the federal government. 
The dramatically increased frequency of “divided government” that marked impor-
tant spells of the more recent past in the United States and in Germany
22 has, however, 
been accompanied by a series of ambivalent developments. Whereas in the United States 
the past decade has been marked by an increasing degree of “party politicization” in the 
legislative arena,
23 the structural conditions for making the Bundesrat an instrument of 
party power and opposition have been seriously challenged, indeed partly undermined, 
by the various effects of German unification. Not only has the number of states signifi-
                                                 
21 Manfred G. Schmidt, “Die „Politik der Inneren Reformen“ in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” Poli-
tische Vierteljahresschrift 19 (1978): 217-219. 
22 The meaning of the term “divided government,” as it is used in the American context, would not seem to 
be in need of any explanation here. In the more recent literature on the German political system, the term 
has been used to refer to the condition of split party control between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, 
rather than between the executive and the legislature. As in any parliamentary system, the majority within 
the Bundestag and the executive branch are functionally integrated and form what is commonly referred to 
as a “governing majority,” even though many decisions by this “governing majority” cannot become law 
without the support of the Bundesrat. See Roland Sturm, “Divided Government in Germany: The Case of 
the Bundesrat,” in Robert Elgie, ed., Divided Government in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001). 
23 While the degree of “party government,” in terms of statistically recorded “party unity votes,” has slight-
ly declined since its peak in the mid-1990s, the congressional atmosphere in the very early twenty-first 
century has been even more aggressively partisan than during earlier periods. For figures on the develop-
ment of partisan voting by chamber since the mid-1950s, see Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 14 
December 2002: 3281-3282; for an analysis of the more latent aspects of “party warfare” in Congress, see 
Eric Schickler, “Congress,” in Gillian Peele et al., eds., Developments in American Politics 4 (London: 
Macmillan, 2002), 108-109.   9
cantly increased (from eleven to sixteen since 1990), but also the gap between the weal-
thier states (mostly located in the west) and between the poorer ones (mostly located in 
the east) has dramatically widened, with many state governments of the poorer states fac-
ing a sometimes irresistable temptation to literally “sell” their Bundesrat votes in ex-
change for generous financial support from the federal government. Moreover, the party 
composition of the state governments has reached an unprecedented level of diversity, 
making it even harder for the two major German parties (CDU/CSU and SPD) to or-
ganize any kind of “concerted action.” In January 2003 there were no less than eight dif-
ferent coalition patterns at the level of state governments. Of the sixteen state govern-
ments, only two had exactly the same party composition as the federal government (SPD-
Green), and just three others were pure CDU/CSU-FDP coalitions corresponding neatly 
to the composition of the “bourgeois” opposition “camp” in the Bundestag.
24 
The potential impact these structural developments within the German federal arena 
may have on the political executive’s room for manoeuvre cannot be meaningfully dis-
cussed without considering the “typical” party constellations in the Bundestag and 
Bundesrat. Whereas since 1945 “divided government” in the United States has usually 
meant Democratic control of Congress and Republican control of the presidency (the 
exceptions being phases of the Truman and Clinton presidencies, 1947/8 and 1995-
2001),
25 the Christian Democrats in Germany have controlled the federal government and 
held a majority in the Bundesrat significantly more often than the Social Democrats. The 
rather differing strategic positions of both parties become particularly obvious if one 
compares the periods during which CDU-led and SPD-led federal governments have 
been able to draw on the support of a Bundesrat being controlled by their own party fel-
lows. Whereas the final three years of the Kohl administration marked a rare exception 
for a CDU-led government to face a SPD-controlled Bundesrat, the Social Democrats 
                                                 
24 Since 1990 the PDS, the successor party of the Communist ruling party of the German Democratic 
Republic, has been represented in the Bundestag alongside the SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP and the Greens, but 
has failed to be acknowledged by the other parties as a potential partner in either government or opposition 
at the federal level. After the federal election of September 2002 the PDS’s share of Bundestag seats was 
dramatically reduced to just 0.3 percent (down from about 5 percent). 
25 However, between 1981 and 1987 “divided government” resulted only from a Democratic majority in 
the House, whereas both the presidency and the Senate were under Republican control. By contrast, during 
spells of the 2001-02 term, “divided government” was due to the wafer-thin Democratic majority in the 
Senate.   10
have hardly ever enjoyed any extended period of “unified government”.
26 The Red-Green 
Schröder government, elected to office in October 1998, began with a working majority 
in the Bundesrat, but lost it soon afterwards due to a major electoral defeat in the state of 
Hesse in early 1999. Later state elections would bring further defeats and successive 
losses of Bundesrat seats for the SPD and the Greens. 
Therefore, the extent to which one might expect future majority constellations in the 
German party system to be similar with those that prevailed for much of the post-war 
period, a relaxation of “party government” in the Bundesrat should quantitatively benefit 
the Social Democrats more than the Christian Democrats. However, the obstacles faced 
by the Schröder government, even during the short spells of “unified government” they 
enjoyed at the start of the 1998-2002 legislative term,
27 are apt to underscore the fact that 
the entire legislative process has become, and seems likely to remain considerably more 
fragmented and less predictable than in the past. 
                                                 
26 Uwe Wagschal, “Der Parteienstaat der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Parteipolitische Zusammensetzung 
seiner Schlüsselinstitutionen,” Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 32 (2001): 872-873. 
27 A brief analysis of the key decisions of this term, including the role of the Bundesrat, can be found in 
Ludger Helms, Politische Opposition. Theorie und Praxis in westlichen Regierungssystemen (Opladen: 
Leske & Budrich, 2002), ch. II, 1.   11
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT  
AND THE GERMAN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
 
From a wider comparative perspective, both the United States and Germany belong 
to that group of advanced democracies with very powerful constitutional courts and 
strong judicial review.
28 Apart from this very basic parallel, differences between the very 
nature of judicial review in both countries – especially as to the conditions of executive 
leadership in the United States and Germany – abound. Some of the most obvious differ-
ences between the Supreme Court and the Federal Constitutional Court relate to their re-
spective positions in either country’s legal system. Unlike the Supreme Court, the Consti-
tutional Court is the Federal Republic’s sole court mandated to rule on cases relating to 
questions of constitutionality at the national level. The only other difference recognized 
by most comparative assessments of judicial review in both countries is the existence – 
or non-existence – of the “political question” doctrine. Unlike the Supreme Court, which 
may refuse any judgment by classifying an issue as a “political question” to be settled 
outside the court,
29 the Federal Constitutional Court must rule on any case that meets the 
formal criteria, however problematic its political implications may be.
30 
The more striking differences between the overall nature of judicial review in the 
United States and Germany relate, however, to the structure of the political process rather 
than to the formal competencies of either court. In most comparative works on the prac-
tice of judicial review in contemporary liberal democracies the primary focus is on the 
role of the constitutional court as a political player throughout the wider legislative proc-
ess. Reflecting the basic institutional logic of parliamentary democracies with their their 
high degree of power-fusion marking the relationship between the executive and (parts 
of) the legislative branch, court judgments challenging the constitutionality of bills are 
usually considered as powerful counter-balances against majority rule in the legislative 
arena. Given the constitutionally and politically independent status of the executive and 
                                                 
28 Christine Landfried, ed., Constitutional Review and Legislation: An International Comparison (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 1988). 
29 It should be acknowledged that there is no clear-cut definition of the term “political question.” As Treso-
lini and Shapiro have noted, “a political question is whatever the Supreme Court says it is.” Rocco J. Tre-
solini and Martin Shapiro, American Constitutional Law, 3rd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1970), 86.   12
the legislature in a presidential democracy, no such perspective may be meaningfully ap-
plied in the United States – at least if the focus is specifically on the possible restrictions 
imposed on the executive. Even bills which have been explicitly supported by a president 
and passed during periods of “unified government” reflect very clearly the character of 
legislation enacted by Congress. Consequently, the entire debate on “judicial legislating” 
in the United States has naturally been centered upon the relationship between the Su-
preme Court and Congress, rather than between the former and the presidency.
31 
By contrast, the German legislative apparatus is markedly different. From the early 
days of the Federal Republic, the Federal Constitutional Court has been understood to be 
a potential veto-player against the executive and its supporting parties in the Bundestag. 
The fundamental empirical parameters of “judicial review” in Germany leave no doubt as 
to the central role of the Court within in the legislative process. A longitudinal study on 
the legislative process in Germany (1949-1994) found that the Court was involved in 40 
percent of all legislative “key decisions.”
32 Nonetheless, the more relevant issue is the 
extent to which the Court has actually been inclined to veto majority decisions of a gov-
erning majority. As empirical assessments show, the overwhelming majority of cases 
falling into the particularly important category of “abstract norm control”
33 has been 
lodged by the opposition parties in the Bundestag or state governments led by the same 
parties.
34 There is, however, no convincing empirical evidence that the Constitutional 
Court has actually tended to decide cases in favour of the opposition. By contrast, the 
Court’s judgments have disclosed a remarkably favourable disposition for the political 
majority constellations in the Federal Republic. While there have been major instances, 
in which the government of the day was defeated by the Constitutional Court, these stand 
                                                                                                                                                 
30 See Christian Rau, Selbst entwickelte Grenzen in der Rechtsprechung des United States Supreme Court 
und des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996). 
31 Henry J. Abraham, The Judicial Process. An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United States, 
England, and France, 7
th ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 371-384; Colton C. 
Campbell and John F. Stack Jr, ed., Congress Confronts the Court. The Struggle for Legitimacy and Au-
thority in Lawmaking (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001). 
32 Klaus von Beyme, Der Gesetzgeber. Der Bundestag als Entscheidungszentrum (Opladen: Westdeutscher 
Verlag, 1997), 302. 
33 According to Article 93 (1), No. 2 of the German constitution (the Basic Law), one-third of the members 
of the Bundestag may challenge any law they think may conflict with the Basic Law before the Constitu-
tional Court. The procedure is “abstract” in the sense that the question of the law’s validity may be purely 
hypothetical and need not have arisen in the course of a legal dispute. 
34 Klaus Stüwe, “Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als verlängerter Arm der Opposition? Eine Bilanz seit 
1951,”  Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B 37-38/2001: 34-44.   13
out as exceptions rather than the rule. Those administrations facing the largest numbers 
of defeats at the hands of the Constitutional Court were those with the weakest political 
support bases in the Federal Republic as a whole (i.e. at the federal and the state level), 
such as the Social-Liberal governments under Chancellors Willy Brandt and Helmut 
Schmidt (1969-1982).
35 Nevertheless, no administration can be guaranteed that its bills 
will remain unchallenged by the Constitutional Court, and even the mere possibility of a 
lawsuit triggered by the opposition significantly strengthens the position of the latter in 
the legislative arena.
36 
On the other hand, it would not be too much of an exaggeration to argue that both the 
institutional and the cultural parameters of executive leadership in Germany have al-
lowed administrations, under certain conditions, to view the Court as an institution that 
may ease, rather than complicate, the process of governing – a scenario that has remained 
largely unnoticed by the international literature on “veto players.” While a widespread 
consensus exists that the degree of “judicialization” of the political decision-making 
process is rather high in Germany, it remains quite debatable as to who is actually to 
blame for this phenomenon. Whereas the Court has, upon several occasions, not hesitated 
to use its resources to influence the decision-making process to the fullest, it must be re-
membered that the Court may act only after having been addressed and, unlike the Su-
preme Court, has no possibility of refusing a decision for political reasons. Given the in-
nate logic of the parliamentary system of government, the opposition parties can hardly 
be blamed for trying to make the most of their veto powers and co-governing devices in 
their attempts to influence political decision-making. Even though no respected tradition 
of democratic “adversarial politics” exists in Germany, opposition forces have rarely 
been criticized for applying frequently to the Court. This is clearly symptomatic of the 
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decidedly legalistic German political culture, which appears to find more satisfaction in 
having an issue settled by a court judgment rather than by the political players in the 
competitive arena. In more recent studies on the problem of “judicialization” of politics 
in Germany, assessments abound which highlight the notable inclination of administra-
tions to shelve unpopular political decisions until such time as the Court eventually inter-
venes to decide a pending issue. This may also imply that judges, rather than the political 
elite, “take the heat” for potentially unwelcome – though not unintended – consequences 
of a decision.
37 
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THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD AND THE BUNDESBANK 
 
Alongside the powerful “second chambers” and constitutional courts, a third common 
characteristic of both countries’ institutional parameters of executive leadership exists in 
the high degree of independence of their respective central banks. In comparative works 
both the Federal Reserve Board (henceforth, the Fed) and the Bundesbank have been 
considered to be among the most independent and powerful central banks in the world.
38 
The Fed has just recently been described as “arguably the most influential policy organ in 
the United States.”
39 Until the creation of the Euro and the transfer of the Bundesbank’s 
power to the European Central Bank, the Bundesbank even enjoyed a slightly higher de-
gree of independence than the Fed. Again, however, what really matters is the actual be-
havior, rather than the formal quality of the players’ veto resources. 
More recent assessments of the Fed’s degree of political independence suggest that 
presidential checks on the Fed – namely the president’s power to appoint the chairman 
and other members of the Board of Governors – may have been overestimated. Not only 
are such appointment opportunities infrequent during a president’s term, but nominees 
also need the support of the Senate. Even upon confirmation, they may not always oper-
ate as reliably loyal supporters of the president.
40  Notably harmonious and close working 
relationships between the president and the Fed’s chairman – examplified by the terms of 
President Gerald Ford and Chairman Arthur Burns – remain the exception and not the 
rule. Whereas explicit bargaining between the president and the Fed, such as to be ob-
served during the Johnson presidency, has remained a rare occurrence, various case stud-
ies suggest that generally a significant degree of presidential influence on the decision-
making process of the Fed’s Board of Governors has existed.
41 
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Nothing similar can be said about the relationship between German federal govern-
ments and the Bundesbank, even though scholars have occasionally doubted the Bank’s 
proverbially high degree of independence. Chancellor Kohl, in particular, was criticized 
for increasing the government’s influence on the Bundesbank through the “back door” of 
party political appointments.
42  The Kohl government also ignored the Bundesbank to the 
largest possible extent in matters of foreign policy, even when issues involved highly im-
portant currency matters. Broader historical assessments seem, however, to confirm the 
strong and independent role of the Bundesbank vis-à-vis the government that has been 
emphasized in comparative works on central bank independence in western democracies. 
A recent thorough empirical analysis of central bank decision-making and political con-
trol in the Federal Republic concludes that “the Bundesbank won most of its conflicts 
with the government.”
43 More specifically, it has been suggested that the policies of the 
Bundesbank have even directly influenced the termination of no less than three chancel-
lorships – Erhard in 1966, Kiesinger in 1969, and Schmidt in 1982.
44 While the Bundes-
bank lost its traditional veto player position due to the creation of a European single 
currency, and the establishment of the European Central Bank, there is a widespread con-
sensus of opinion that the recent stages of “Europeanization” have yet further diminished 
– rather than increased – the room for manoeuvre of German governments in the area of 
monetary policy.
45 
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INTEREST GROUPS AND THE MASS MEDIA 
 
While interest groups and the mass media have to date rarely been the focus of more 
recent works on “institutional pluralism” in liberal democracies, their very nature pro-
vides them with the potential to function as major “veto players” against governments in 
the United States and Germany. The specific character of interest-group politics in the 
U.S.,
46 is the result of both the highly pluralist nature of the interest-group system and the 
key features of the constitutionally provided separation of powers. As a British observer 
has stated, “well-organised groups confront a disorganised state.”
47 Some of the signifi-
cant powers of American interest groups in the wider political process relate to their re-
markable, mainly finance-based influence on the making and breaking of candidates 
campaigning for the office of president – a systemic function of interest groups for which 
there is no equivalent in Germany and most other West European parliamentary democ-
racies. The strength of the American interest groups can also be identified in the public 
policy-making process. In many more recent assessments of the political parameters of 
executive leadership in the United States, the interest groups are considered the key rea-
son for the president’s (alleged) inability to govern properly.
48 As White House involve-
ment with political agenda-setting and law-making has become more pronounced over 
recent decades, lobbyists have indeed long come to infect the power centers at both ends 
of Pennsylvania Avenue. This notwithstanding, and all other things being equal, the 
executive branch in presidential systems remains to a lesser extent the target of interest 
groups than their counterpart in parliamentary democracies. Still, presidents have rarely 
profited from this somewhat lower intensity of lobbyism at the core executive. On the 
contrary, the fact that many interest groups are successful at establishing long-term work-
ing relationships with selected congressional committees and cabinet departments, in-
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creases the likelihood that presidents in many policy fields can find themselves outside 
the core of the applicable decision-making network. 
In Germany, as in other parliamentary democracies, much of the lobbying activities 
of interest groups focuses on the executive branch. While there is no legal requirement 
for major interest groups to be consulted by the federal government at the early stages of 
the law-making process, there has been a long-standing practice whereby administrations 
do consult key interest groups in a given field, and on a regular basis. In fact, as recent 
surveys confirm, the interest groups themselves consider contacts with the administration 
as significantly more important, and effective, than activities within the parliamentary 
arena.
49 
However, this is not the only major difference between the German and American 
models of interest-group politics. In contrast to their American counterparts the major in-
terest groups in Germany, especially in the field of economics and labor relations, have 
little in common with the textbook prototype of “pressure groups” which describe many 
of the American interest groups fairly well. Whereas Germany cannot be considered as a 
classic example of a corporatist country
50 either, a notable tradition of peaceful “tripar-
tite” negotiating marks an important component of the “German model.” Although, even 
at the height of the corporatist era in Germany during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 
impact of corporatist arrangements has been limited to a small number of policy fields 
(such as health policy in particular), the results of negotiations have temporarily eased 
the burden of governing for German administrations. Since German unification, the so-
ciological and structural conditions for establishing functional tripartite decision-making 
networks have, however, deteriorated rather improved.
51 While the so-called “Bündnis 
für Arbeit” (“Alliance for Jobs”), created in 1998 by the Schröder government, following 
earlier half-hearted experiments of the Kohl government, figured largely in the public de-
bate about possible solutions to the problems of soaring unemployment and an ailing 
economy, it remained a debating club and a strategically useful instrument for Chancellor 
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Schröder rather than a powerful decision-making agency. In hindsight, its eventual scrap-
ping by the Schröder government early in 2003 seems to have been in the cards since the 
summer of 1999.
52 Aside from the recent breakdown of such tripartite arrangements, the 
nearly legendary veto-power of the major German interest groups, and of the trade un-
ions in particular, has gradually dissipated. The reasons for this were largely the same as 
in many other West European countries: declining membership, increasing intra-
organizational conflicts over the distribution of scarce resources, growing competition 
among different groups from the same spectrum of political interests, and a structurally 
deteriorating political opportunity structure due to ever scarcer financial resources of the 
state.
53 
There are, last but not least, also a number of major differences regarding the role of 
the media and media management as a variable within the leadership process in the 
United States and Germany. There has been scant truly comparative research on the in-
stitutional conditions of public leadership in presidential and parliamentary democracies. 
Most accounts, even when discussing a single country, focus on the different talents and 
strategies of individual “chief executives” in the field of media management and public 
leadership. In fact, the huge differences in the performances of individual office- holders 
(acting under largely identical institutional conditions within a given country), would 
suggest that most differentials may be explained by the differing personalities and skills 
of the actors involved.
54 
Some important differences in the institutional parameters of executive leadership in 
both countries may, nevertheless, be identified. To begin with, a number of differences 
(some ambiguous), exist with regard to the functional roles of the media in presidential 
and parliamentary democracies. On the one hand, the role of the mass media in American 
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politics is a more central one than that one of their counterparts in most West European 
parliamentary democracies, including Germany; in the latter, many systemic functions 
continue to be performed mainly by the political parties.
55 However, the quasi-ubiquitous 
nature of the media must not be confused with its alleged omnipotence. In fact, the net 
impact of the mass media, especially on political agenda-setting, tends to be even more 
limited in the U.S. than in the parliamentary democracies, as each alteration in the office 
of president is accompanied by the introduction of a completely new policy agenda.
56 
There are, secondly, major differences regarding the overall concepts and public ex-
pectations of public leadership in both countries. These, again, are strongly influenced by 
the basic constitutional structures of the American and German polity, respectively. The 
virtually unquestioned position of the president as the system’s “focal point” may have 
been favored by the potent cultural paradigms of this country; but it is also attributable to 
the very nature of the American constitutional construct, in which the president is the 
only politically responsible actor. There is no natural “opposition leader” or an “alterna-
tive government” in the presidential system, who can adequately compete with the presi-
dent for media attention (even though some congressional majority leaders, such as Gin-
grich or Daschle, have tried play this role). This may be perceived as having both advan-
tages and disadvantages from the president’s point of view. While his exceptionally 
exposed position would seem to provide him with a unique opportunity to serve as the 
system’s “agenda-setter-in-chief”
57 – which is not (or at least not to a comparable extent) 
                                                                                                                                                 
54 See in this vein, for the U.S., Fred I. Greenstein, The Presidential Difference. Leadership Style from 
FDR to Clinton (New York: Martin Kessler, 2000). 
55 For a comparative assessment that covers both the United States and Germany see Wolfgang Jäger, 
Fernsehen und Demokratie. Scheinplebiszitäre Tendenzen und Repräsentation in den USA, Großbritan-
nien, Frankreich und Deutschland (Munich: Beck, 1992). For a comparison between the American and the 
German parties see Peter Lösche, “The American Parties after the Cold War. A Comparative Perspective,” 
in Herbert Dittgen and Michael Minkenberg, eds., The American Impasse. U.S. Domestic and Foreign Pol-
icy after the Cold War (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996). 
56 Klaus von Beyme and Hartmut Weßler, “Politische Kommunikation als Entscheidungskommunikation,” 
in Otfried Jarren, Ulrich Sarcinelli and Ulrich Saxer, eds., Politische Kommunikation in der demokratis-
chen Gesellschaft (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998). 
57 It should be noted, however, that this is not what the findings of recent research on presidential leader-
ship and the president’s role in the political agenda setting process suggest. In fact, recent studies have 
questioned the conventional wisdom that considers the president as the country’s “chief agenda setter.” Ac-
cording to the authors of these works, the president is better described as a political player able at times to 
operate as “issue entrepreneur” than the system’s dominant agenda setter. See George C. Edwards and B. 
Dan Wood, “Who Influences Whom? The President, Congress, and the Media,” American Political 
Science Review 93 (1999): 327-344; Roy B. Flemming, B. Dan Wood and John Bohte, “Attention to Issues 
in a System of Separated Powers: The Macrodynamics of American Policy Agendas,” The Journal of 
Politics 61 (1999): 76-108.   21
available to German chancellors or to other West European “chief executives” – it also 
compels U.S. administrations to focus intently on issues of media management. Thus, all 
other things being equal, German chancellors have been able to devote a considerably 
larger share of their time and energy to tackle the policy dimensions of political decision-
making than their American counterparts.
58 
Another difference concerns the “emotional” climate in which the relationship be-
tween the media and the two countries’ “chief executives,” i.e. presidents and chancel-
lors, evolves. As many observers accustomed to the style of media reporting on politics 
in West European democracies are quick to realize, most media reports on the president 
in the United States are decidedly more respectful than those of the German mass media 
on the chancellor. Also this pattern may be explained, not exclusively but also, by insti-
tutional differences. As the office of president combines the roles of head of the political 
executive and head of state, there are manifold situations in which he can draw from the 
well of public respect, which in most parliamentary democracies is available only to the 
head of state, be it a monarch or an elected president as in Germany. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
The aim of this paper has been to highlight the significant differences that mark the con-
ditions of executive leadership in the wider political processes of the United States and 
the Federal Republic of Germany despite their common, high degree of “institutional 
pluralism.” Similar differences can be found at the level of scholarly assessments of the 
key problems within the constitutional practice of both countries. While in most studies 
on the American political system, the focus has been primarily on what one author has 
described as “a quite awesome deficit of accountability”
59 of the political process, many 
critiques of the contemporary German polity tend rather to concentrate on the system’s 
inability to bring about major policy reform.
60 Given the rather different natures of 
American and German political culture, it may not come as too much of a surprise that 
comparable differences can be found at the level of beliefs and perceptions among both 
countries’ citizens. These, in turn, generate rather different “cultural parameters” of ex-
ecutive leadership in Washington and Berlin which may well reinforce the effects of the 
institutional differences discussed above. 
One may therefore conclude that the structural conditions of governing and govern-
ance in both countries are in fact rather different, and are likely to remain as such for the 
foreseeable future. The theoretical implications of this finding can be easily summarized: 
Whereas the number and strength of institutional “veto players” that characterize a given 
system marks, in fact, an important dimension of contemporary liberal democracies to be 
duly considered in future comparative political research, the older distinction between 
parliamentary and presidential government has not become obsolete. Even though many 
“textbook views” on presidential and parliamentary government may be in need of revi-
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sion,
61 there can be no doubt that institutional “veto players” do perform different roles, 
and produce different effects, under parliamentary and presidential government. 
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dential government see G. Tsebelis, Veto Players, 72-75. 